The focus of the report is to discuss in depth Scotland’s four currency options, should it vote to separate from the UK. They are:
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Formal Currency Union
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This option is the SNP’s preferred arrangement. It would involve Scotland retaining sterling with the agreement of the rest of the UK, meaning the Bank of England would act as a lender of last resort for Scottish banks and account for the needs of the Scottish economy when setting monetary policy.
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The Scottish government’s independent Fiscal Commission suggested an independent Scotland could expect to receive shareholder rights on a per capita weighted basis, meaning Scotland could appoint a representative to the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee. It was suggested that this individual should take part in the committee’s meetings to provide governmental input, much like a UK Treasury official does now. The representative would have no vote (as is currently the case with the UK Treasury official).
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The SNP argue this arrangement makes sense for three reasons. Firstly, Scotland has a historical share in the Bank of England; secondly, businesses in Scotland, as well as those in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, would all benefit from using the same currency; and thirdly, assuming a 90% share of North Sea revenues, Scotland would bring a £40 billion contribution to balance of payments across the sterlingzone. This would be boosted further by Scotch whisky exports, worth around £4 billion.
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There are some problems with the SNP’s analysis here, however. The first is a practical one. As I’ve mentioned before (
here,
here, and
here), it is not actually clear that 90% of North Sea revenues are Scottish. There is absolutely nothing in the law of the sea that states the median line must be the method of division, although it is often the starting point in territorial disputes. For one, the division of the North Sea reserves would be part of a wider negotiating process, including who bears the burden of decommissioning costs (estimated to be £30 billion). The SNP take the view that Scotland should take 90% of North Sea oil and gas, but rUK should be responsible for 90% of the decommissioning costs. This position would most likely not be accepted by Westminster.
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Moreover, international law always emphasises disputing parties to reach an ‘equitable’ solution. As a result, Westminster could argue that since British resources have been used to develop the oil fields (e.g. HMRC have a specific oil and gas tax division), they should receive more revenues. Such negotiations could be complicated further if Shetland and Orkney expressed a desire to remain part of the UK. The islands are estimated to lay claim to 30% of all North Sea reserves. In a wider sense it should also be noted that Scotland’s exact contribution to the UK balance of payments accounts is not clear. At present there is no balance of payments data for Scotland, only for the UK as a whole.
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Secondly, it is important to recognise is that the whole point of independence is to go with a mandate to the UK government to bring an end to Acts of the UK parliament being legislated in Scotland. The SNP cannot pick and choose which Acts they like and those they do not. The UK is not an à la carte menu. The Bank of England is governed by Acts of the UK parliament, not the Scottish one. So, in the event of independence, the Bank of England would no longer be a central bank for Scotland, by definition. Any formal currency union would require the agreement of the UK.
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Moreover, as the UK government’s analysis makes clear, of course there would be benefits to businesses in Scotland and rUK of using the same currency. But crucially there are also costs. Firstly there could be significant adverse trade effects. If there was a substantial rise in oil prices the sterling exchange rate would appreciate. The appreciation of this exchange rate could harm future export realisation for rUK businesses (see
Dutch disease for more detail). Yet at the same time the UK economy would not benefit from the balance of payments, nor would it receive the tax revenues from these resources. Alternatively, a declining oil price might weaken the sterling exchange rate, leading to inflationary pressures in the UK. These factors may lead to problems implementing other policy objectives.
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Secondly, different fiscal policy decisions would eventually lead to a divergence in the economies of Scotland and rUK, meaning each economy becomes exposed to difference shocks at different points in time. The end result is that monetary policy set by the Bank of England would become less adapted to the needs of the Scottish economy over time.
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More fundamentally, however, is the risk that would be imposed upon rUK taxpayers. Suppose the government of an independent Scotland excessively over spent (public spending in Scotland is already one of the highest in the developed world, and the SNP say they will increase it further under separation) and the budget deficit increased. Scottish bond yields would rise and the price of Scottish bonds would fall. Hence, the balance sheet of Scottish banks holding Scottish bonds would be severely weakened. In that scenario, the Bank of England might then need to step in to support those banks through its lender of last resort operations. But in a sterlingzone 90% of the GDP would originate from the UK. Thus, the ultimate liability of Scottish debt would end up being underwritten by rUK taxpayers.
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An independent Scottish state would therefore need to agree a negotiated set of constraints on its economic and fiscal policies. In practice this would be likely to require rigorous oversight of Scotland’s economic and fiscal plans by both the new Scottish and the continuing UK authorities. These constraints would need to reflect the difference in the degree of exposure to fiscal risk.
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Now not only would this involve the surrender of fiscal sovereignty, rendering independence almost redundant given the fact the Scottish government already has control of domestic policy, but it is important to recognise that these terms would be decided upon by the UK, not Scotland. A country of 58 million people would not sign their sovereignty over to a country of 5 million people, and Scotland would need the monetary union far more than the UK. So any deal would be expected to reflect that.
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Another key issue is that it is not just public debt that could pose a risk to rUK taxpayers, but private debt too. In the eurozone, for instance, Ireland and Spain had a lower debt-to-GDP ratio than Germany before the crisis, so even if the eurozone had strong rules it would not have caught them. The problem in these countries has largely been excessive private borrowing. Would there be private borrowing restrictions too?
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In any case, is also not clear how this oversight would be enforced. If a eurozone country broke the Maastricht criteria the European Commission pressured them to take measures to reduce its deficit. But if it broke the rules in three consecutive years a fine of up to 0.5% of GDP would be imposed. As we have seen, the Maastricht criteria has not been strictly adhered to, so there are clear enforcement problems with stability pacts.
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All in all then, these problems provide a large disincentive for the UK to agree to a formal currency union. So now we have another question: what is the SNP’s Plan B?
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Sterlingisation
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In theory, Scotland could just unilaterally adopt sterling as its currency. An obvious advantage of this would be the low cost and simplicity of implementation. That being said, this option is unlikely to be realistic for a separate Scotland. Firstly, it would have to import a sufficient quantity of sterling to ensure there was enough of the currency for people and businesses to use, and to allow the banking system to function. It could do this in two ways: running consistent current account surpluses; or borrowing heavily in that currency. The first of these methods seems an unlikely scenario for Scotland, and the second does not appear to be a sustainable solution.
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Furthermore, the lack of a lender of last resort would cause some severe problems for Scottish banks and as a consequence the entire financial system would become vulnerable. The banks would then have no option to relocate their headquarters to England, Wales, or Northern Ireland.
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Although a small number of countries adopt this approach, the above issues would make sterlingisation far too problematic for an economy as large and complex as Scotland’s.
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Join the Euro
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As I have previously mentioned (
here,
here,
here, and
here), all new member states to the European Union (EU) are legally obliged to adopt the euro as their currency. However, this would not be an instant process as Scotland would have to meet the criteria first, which currently it does not.
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But Scotland’s lack of convergence with the Maastricht criteria is not just limited to deficit and debt targets. One of the criteria for joining the euro is to be a member of the exchange rate mechanism for at least 2 years, where the country’s central bank is expect to maintain exchange rate fluctuations within a specified range. Clearly, Scotland does not have its own central bank, nor does it have its own currency. So Scotland would either have to hope sterling could fulfil this role for them, or it would have to negotiate a special case with the EU.
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Moreover, although the other EU member states would probably want to see Scotland commit to joining the euro at some point in the future, it is unlikely they would force it to join the euro straight away while they are still in the midst of a crisis, especially given Scotland does not meet the criteria.
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It therefore seems unlikely that a separate Scotland would join the euro in the short term. If Scotland did adopt the euro eventually it would enjoy the advantage of having a lender of last resort, but its trade links with the UK would be damaged.
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A Separate Scottish Currency
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The final option for Scotland would be to create its own currency. This option is favoured by some Yes Scotland supporters, including
Patrick Harvie from the Scottish Green Party. With its own currency, Scotland would have complete control over its economic policies. It could also peg the currency (S£) to any currency it wanted, which would most likely be sterling.
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A S£/£ currency peg would bring more stability for businesses, but the Scottish central bank would effectively give up monetary policy as a policy instrument because it must increase the money supply in line with money demand by buying and selling the S£ on the foreign exchange market with its sterling reserves.
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Alternatively Scotland could have a floating exchange rate, so the value of the S£ would be determined by supply and demand conditions prevailing in the foreign exchange market. This option would give Scotland the most flexibility as it would devalue its currency or control interest rates in response to economic conditions.
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Again, however, this option introduces some substantial problems. Apart from the significant transition costs of setting up a central bank some fundamental issues would need to be addressed. For starters, if Scotland wanted to peg the S£ to sterling it would need to build up a large quantity of sterling reserves and maintain its discipline. The Scottish government would also need to be prepared for adjustments in the real exchange rate to occur largely through nominal wages and prices as it could not devalue its currency.
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But even in a flexible exchange rate regime there would be important questions that would need answered. In what currency would Scotland’s share of the UK’s national debt be denominated in? What impact would this process have on the financial services industry and the economy as a whole? How would these issues be managed? And how long would this whole process take? Oh, and what would be a realistic value for the currency?
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A separate Scottish currency would also most likely see the largest divergence between the Scottish and rUK economies in a post-separation scenario, meaning the current trade links with the UK would be substantially damaged. Businesses would also face additional risks due to multiple transactions in different currencies. Of course, this risk could be hedged, but that would only bring additional costs.
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Conclusion
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In summary then, an independent Scotland would have many options open to it. It could ask rUK if it could would agree to a formal monetary union, but this might not be accepted. And in all probability it is difficult to see what the long term incentive is for the UK to agree to such a deal.
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Failure to achieve this opens up the option of sterlingisation for Scotland, but due to the size and complexity of its economy it would cause far more problems than it solved. Alternatively Scotland would enter tough negotiations with the EU to discuss the most simplistic way to adopt the euro, but that hardly seems like a wise route to go down at the present moment.
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The only other realistic option then, would be to create a new Scottish currency. Under this scenario, Scotland could peg its currency to sterling or adopt a flexible exchange rate regime. If that is to be the case, Scotland must be prepared for a prolonged period of deep uncertainty.
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What is very clear after the
UK Treasury’s analysis is that the current arrangement works best. Whereas those proposing separation do not have a clear vision on what currency an independent Scotland would have, how that currency would be controlled, or what its value would be, many Scots have confidence in the current system. Scotland already has sterling, so it is not clear why it needs to separate from the UK to use it as its currency.
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As part of the United Kingdom, Scotland has a central bank that works with and for Scotland. That is not a benefit worth throwing away lightly. And it is a very very good reason to vote NO in next year’s referendum.